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Question 
What supporting institutional and monitoring mechanisms are needed for the success of 
programmes that use CCTs or baby bonds to reduce female infanticide, child marriage and 
promote girl’s education? What costs are involved? Are there examples of self-monitoring by 
communities? Is there evidence that such programmes achieve greater impact through 
coordination with other types of interventions? Focus: South Asia and other LMICs. 
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The focus of this paper is on the complementary mechanisms and interventions likely to increase 
the effectiveness and impact of conditional cash transfer (CCT) schemes in South Asia that aim 
to reduce female infanticide and child marriage and promote girls’ education. The literature on 
the institutional aspects of these particular schemes is limited, but from this and from the wider 
literature on CCT programmes in similar contexts, the following institutional mechanisms are 
likely to enhance success: 
• A strong information and communication strategy that enhances programme reach and 
coverage and ensures stakeholder awareness. 
• Advance agreements with financial institutions, documented in memoranda of 
understanding and complementary guidelines. 
• A simple and flexible registration process that minimises documentary demands on 
beneficiaries. 
• Appropriate use of technology to strengthen access, disbursement, and oversight. 
• Adequate implementation capacity to support processes of outreach, enrolment, and 
monitoring. 
• Monitoring and accountability mechanisms, embedded in programme design, that also 
draw on support from civil society groups, local governance institutions, and social 
networks. 
• Coordination mechanisms across government, across social protection schemes, and 
with complementary interventions that are likely to promote the social changes sought by 
these schemes. 
• An effective management information system that reinforces coordination and oversight. 
• The provision of quality services in the sectors for which conditions are required. 
There is a very limited body of evidence that explores these institutional issues as they apply to 
the specific CCT programmes that are the focus of this report – i.e. those that seek to reduce 
female infanticide and early marriage and promote girls’ education. For example, no studies were 
found that looked at their monitoring challenges in any detail, nor their costs, and no evidence 
was found of community self-monitoring, although the wider literature does suggest ways in 
which local structures and groups can reinforce cash transfer programming. Monitoring and 
accountability mechanisms appear to be a particular weakness of these CCT programmes, 
although some of the newer schemes are increasing their investment in monitoring, oversight, 
and accountability, including through the use of digital platforms. 
There is more available evidence of the potential impact of ‘cash-plus’ programmes, which 
complement the transfers with other interventions designed to enhance their results or address 
the structural barriers to well-being. The literature suggests that this approach may be particularly 
relevant for these girl-child-focused CCT programmes, given that the behaviours they seek to 
incentivise are significantly shaped by deep-seated social norms that are unlikely to be 
influenced by financial measures alone. 




Given the subject of this paper, the literature reviewed has an explicit concern with addressing 
gender-based inequalities. There was no obvious discussion of intersectionality and the situation 
of girls who also live with disability. 
2. Institutional mechanisms that support CCTs  
The strong preference for male children in South Asian countries is evident in practices such as 
sex-selective abortion, early and forced marriage, denial of girls’ education, and gender-based 
violence (UNICEF, 2018). While the rates of both child marriage and adolescent fertility are 
falling in the region, South Asia still accounts for 44 per cent of child marriage globally, more than 
any other region in the world; around one-third of adolescent girls in Bangladesh and one-sixth in 
Nepal have either given birth or are pregnant (UNICEF, 2018, p. 5). Lack of education is 
regarded as both a risk factor for, and a likely outcome of, child marriage (Parsons & McCleary-
Sills, 2014). 
Governments and other actors are adopting a range of strategies to reduce these gender-based 
inequalities, one of which is the use of conditional cash transfers (CCTs). The aim of these 
programmes is to incentivise desired behaviours with cash payments once certain targets in a 
girl’s development have been met, such as registration of birth or completion of secondary 
education while still unmarried (Endow et al, 2015). 
The focus of this paper is on the complementary mechanisms and interventions that are likely to 
increase the effectiveness and impact of girl-child-focused CCT schemes in South Asia. 
However, few of the programmes have been thoroughly evaluated (Endow et al, 2015; Sekher & 
Ram, 2015; Jain & Mittal, 2018). The searches for this report found no studies that had been 
directly designed to answer the research question, although pointers to possible answers can be 
gleaned from other literature. This resonates with the findings of other desk studies: in their 
rigorous review of the global cash transfer literature, analysing evidence not just of the impact of 
transfers on various outcomes but also of the links between programme design / implementation 
and those outcomes, Bastagli et al (2016) found that the evidence base for the latter was smaller 
than the former.1 Bhargava & Rava (2015) contrast the rich body of impact evaluations of CCT 
programmes with the relative dearth of material assessing their management of risk in general 
and their use of social accountability approaches in particular. 
Given the above, the literature on the institutional and monitoring aspects of these particular 
schemes is rather limited. However, from this and from the wider literature on CCT programmes 
in similar contexts, the following institutional mechanisms are likely to enhance success: 
1. Information and communication strategy. Disseminating information about CCT 
schemes among potential beneficiaries is key to improving their reach and coverage. For 
example, some schemes in India use the mass media, Gram Panchayats,2 or grassroots 
 
1 Particular knowledge gaps highlighted by the authors include the role of grievance mechanisms and programme 
governance, payment mechanisms, and variations in conditionality design and implementation. 
2 Village-level governance structure. 




workers such as school teachers or Aanganwadi3 workers to increase awareness and 
motivate people to register (Endow et al, 2015). A strong information and communication 
strategy also ensures awareness among other stakeholders, such as frontline workers, 
officials in financial institutions, and programme administrators (Jain & Mittal, 2018). 
2. Advance agreements with financial institutions. Weaknesses in negotiation and 
coordination with banks and insurance companies have caused delays in the 
disbursement of benefits and in some cases the discontinuation of schemes (Sekher & 
Ram, 2015). Financial security is particularly critical for schemes that provide a terminal 
benefit that matures when a girl reaches adulthood (Sekher, 2015). There have also 
been instances of bank managers refusing to open the agreed zero-balance accounts 
into which the cash transfers will be paid (Brahme & Kumar, 2015; Sekher & Ram, 2015). 
Pre-agreed partnership terms, documented in a memorandum of understanding and 
complementary guidelines, are recommended (Brahme & Kumar, 2015; Sekher & Ram, 
2015). 
3. A simple and flexible registration process. Potential beneficiaries of CCT schemes 
can face bureaucratic challenges, particularly in accessing the relevant officials and 
producing evidence of eligibility (Sekher & Ram, 2015; Jain & Mittal, 20184). Sekher & 
Ram (2015, p. 60) find that the main reason why people did not enrol in the 
Dhanalakshmi scheme, which focused on child marriage and on both the education and 
health needs of girls, was the number of documents required. Simplifying scheme 
conditionalities, and therefore the corresponding documentation, as well as providing 
multiple options to register, are recommended (Endow et al, 2015; Jain & Mittal, 2018). 
4. Appropriate integration of technology. Digital technologies are increasingly being 
used to streamline the implementation of cash transfer schemes and improve access, 
disbursement, and monitoring. For example, the Bhagyalakshmi scheme in Karnataka, 
which aims to prevent female foeticide and child marriage and promote girls’ education, 
has an online enrolment and tracking system which allows the status of each of its over 
two million girls to be monitored. However, there are two important considerations: first, 
that beneficiaries are able to access the chosen platforms and equipment and receive 
communications in a language they know, and second, that the supporting infrastructure 
(power supply, internet connectivity) is in place (Endow et al, 2015). 
5. Adequate implementation capacity. CCT schemes require sufficient numbers of 
adequately trained personnel to support processes of outreach, enrolment, and 
monitoring. The authors of a study of the Samata programme in Karnataka associated 
higher performance in one district with the length of experience and level of educational 
qualification of the outreach workers there.5 Last-mile functionaries need clear 
responsibilities, suitable compensation for extra workload, and periodic capacity 
 
3 Rural child care centre. 
4 This study focuses on cash transfers to improve under-five child health, although one of the seven Indian 
programmes reviewed is Dhanalakshmi. 
5 Samata is not a cash transfer programme, but one that uses multiple strategies to help girls remain in education 
as a way of delaying marriage and sexual debut. One of these strategies is to link families to government cash 
transfer schemes and other sources of financial support (Prakash et al, 2019) 




development (Endow et al, 2015).6 Prabhu (2009) highlights a general capacity challenge 
for governments, which may be more familiar with delivering physical goods and services 
than managing individual transfers closer to the point of impact. 
6. Monitoring and accountability mechanisms. Several studies find that these are a 
general weakness in CCT programming in South Asia (Endow et al, 2015; Sekher, 2015; 
Jain & Mittal, 2018; Tebaldi & Bilo, 2019). Mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation, 
and for ensuring accountability, should be integrated in programme design (Schjødt, 
2017; Sekher, 2010). Longitudinal surveys are needed to capture the medium and long-
term impacts of interventions after girls reach adulthood (Chant et al, 2017). There is 
scope for greater involvement of civil society groups and local-level networks in 
monitoring and accountability processes (Sekher, 2015; Bhargava & Rava, 2015; 
Rohwerder, 2016). 
7. Coordination mechanisms. Endow et al (2015) identify different types of coordination: 
a. Across government. Those who certify conditionalities (often education or 
health officials) may be from other parts of government than those who 
administer CCT schemes and make payments (Brahme & Kumar, 2015). 
Similarly, those involved in registering beneficiaries depend on timely action by 
those issuing personal documentation, such as birth certificates (Sekher, 2015). 
Some cash transfer schemes may have multiple components linked with different 
government services, or function at different levels of government. For all these 
reasons, cross-governmental coordination is key to effective implementation. All 
relevant agencies should be involved in programme design so that its 
implementation strategy is feasible and coordination is built in from the very 
beginning (Endow et al, 2015). 
b. Across social protection schemes. This allows governments to harmonise 
provision and provide a ‘continuum of care’. An example of this is the 
Mukhyamantri Kanya Utthan Yojana (MKUY) programme in Bihar, which is a 
universal, integrated CCT programme to promote the value of the girl child that 
consolidates 21 cash transfers over the first 21 years of a girl's life, between birth 
and completion of a university degree, implemented by the departments of social 
welfare, education, and health under one umbrella (Arruda et al, 2020).  
c. With other interventions. In order to achieve the long-term societal change 
envisaged by these CCT programmes, transfers alone are insufficient and need 
complementing with other interventions, as discussed in section 5 below (Endow 
et al, 2015). 
8. An effective management information system (MIS) can facilitate these various 
coordination objectives. For example, a single registry database allows beneficiaries of 
one scheme to be linked more easily with other schemes and complementary services, 
although this requires the necessary political, institutional, and technical capacity, as well 
as thorough attention to privacy concerns (Esser et al, 2019). The requirements for an 
 
6 Some schemes in Karnataka, Odisha, and West Bengal offer cash incentives to frontline workers in recognition 
of their additional responsibilities (Endow et al, 2015). India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana, a CCT programme 
focused on safe motherhood, pays both the woman attending a health facility for delivery and the community 
health worker who accompanies her, although there is little evidence on the relative effectiveness of these 
incentives, or the complementarities between them (Jain & Mittal, 2018). 




effective MIS include political support, sufficient numbers of trained personnel, adequate 
hardware and infrastructure, a national identification system, and a high-level governance 
structure to oversee the process and coordinate stakeholders (Roelen et al, 2017). 
9. Supply-side interventions. The quality of services is a key determinant of their take-up 
and impact (Jain & Mittal, 2018; Sekher & Ram, 2015). For example, Sen & Dutta (2017) 
attribute the persistent high rate at which girls in West Bengal are dropping out of school 
to the low quality of education being provided. 
3. Monitoring and accountability 
Most of the CCT schemes that are the focus of this report lack proper monitoring mechanisms, 
and most have no baseline survey. Monitoring is carried out by the implementing departments 
through their routine processes, such as monthly meetings with frontline workers or discussions 
with local leaders (Endow et al, 2015; Sekher, 2015; Sekher & Ram, 2015), although there is a 
growing trend towards using digital platforms (Jain & Mittal, 2018). Systematic monitoring and 
evaluation is an urgent unmet need (Sekher, 2015). 
No studies were found that discuss the monitoring challenges specific to these girl-child-focused 
CCT schemes, such as oversight of the terminal benefit, nor of self-monitoring by communities. 
Less than half of the 50 social protection programmes in South Asia reviewed by Tebaldi & Bilo 
(2019) use some form of community monitoring or social audit, and only one of these was a CCT 
programme.7  
Participatory monitoring and evaluation, through mechanisms such as citizen report cards, may 
be considered a form of social accountability (Bastagli et al, 2016). Aylliffe et al (2017) categorise 
social accountability mechanisms into three: 
i. Grievance redress / complaints and appeals mechanisms, which allow individuals to 
lodge complaints or appeal decisions and seek redress.  
ii. Structured mechanisms, which facilitate collective feedback on service delivery through 
mechanisms such as community scorecards, citizen report cards, and social audits. 
iii. Community committees, which help to raise awareness and strengthen engagement 
between state and citizens, often used in conjunction with grievance mechanisms.  
None of the studies reviewed by Bastagli et al (2016) analysed the impact of having a functioning 
grievance mechanism or social auditing system.8 Given the potential effect of such systems on 
 
7 The Benazir Income Support Programme in Pakistan. A similar mechanism is envisaged in the documentation 
for the Pradhan Mantri Matritva Vandana Yojana scheme in India (maternal health). The scope of the review by 
Tebaldi & Bilo (2019) is wider than girl-child-focused CCT schemes. Thirteen of the 50 programmes reviewed 
provide CCTs: five of them educational stipend or scholarship programmes in Bangladesh and Nepal, and the 
rest for various purposes (income support, mother and child health). Social audits involving the panchayats and 
communities are also used in India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (Prabhu, 2009). 
8 The six design features covered by this review are: (i) core cash transfer design features (e.g. main recipient, 
transfer value and frequency, duration of the transfer), (ii) conditionality, (iii) targeting mechanisms, (iv) payment 
systems, (v) grievance mechanisms and programme governance, and (vi) complementary interventions and 
supply-side services. 




the outcomes of cash transfer programmes, the authors suggest that this is an important 
knowledge gap.  
Tebaldi & Bilo (2019) find that South Asia’s social protection programmes lack comprehensive 
grievance and complaints mechanisms and that there is little evidence of complaints and 
feedback informing programme design. Many of the CCT programmes reviewed in India also 
lack built-in grievance redress mechanisms; where they exist, beneficiaries may not be aware of 
them (Endow et al, 2015). Jain & Mittal (2018) concur that grievance mechanisms are one of the 
weakest aspects of cash transfer programming. They recommend providing multiple avenues for 
citizens to lodge complaints that are appropriate in the local context and sufficiently independent 
of those implementing the scheme. They also recommend exploring the potential for local 
panchayats to play a mediating role, subject to measures being in place to manage power 
dynamics at that level. Esser et al (2019) advise that grievance mechanisms must take account 
of potential barriers created by culture or literacy levels and include some independent element. 
In Bangladesh and Nepal, community committees and women’s groups have been established 
and facilitated by NGOs supporting child-sensitive social protection (Ayliffe et al, 2017, p. 45). 
These groups have been effective in disseminating information but less effective in mobilising 
civic action, attributed to their lack of confidence and low social cohesion, as well as the 
challenges of fostering civic mobilisation through an externally driven initiative (Schjødt, 2017). 
Bhargava & Rava (2015) and Rohwerder (2016) discuss how civil society organisations could 
support accountability in cash transfer programmes, emphasising that this should complement, 
not substitute for, government accountability mechanisms. Examples include providing 
independent third-party monitoring, facilitating links between authorities and beneficiaries, 
advocating information transparency, and delivering rights education to beneficiaries. 
Sekher (2015) notes that most CCT schemes in India have limited involvement of civil society 
organisations, women’s groups, and local panchayats. He suggests that the latter in particular 
are best-placed to identify beneficiaries, monitor progress, and ensure that transfers are correctly 
made. Clear guidelines for the involvement of panchayats and civil society groups are needed. 
Monitoring systems and accountability mechanisms should both be considered during 
programme design (Schjødt, 2017; Sekher, 2010). Programmes that target adolescent girls 
should also invest in longitudinal data collection so that their legacy effects on issues such as 
fertility and lifetime income can be understood (Chant et al, 2017). 
4. Costs 
There is very little available evidence on the costs (financial or non-financial) of providing these 
supporting mechanisms. In their systematic review of literature on interventions to prevent child 
marriage in low- and middle-income countries, Kalamar et al (2016) note that most did not 
include cost data.9 Subsequent studies found the same (Chae & Ngo, 2017; Jain & Mittal, 2018). 
 
9 The studies retained for final analysis included one from Bangladesh and two from India, although none were 
CCT programmes. The cash transfer programmes in the sample were from Mexico, Kenya, and Malawi. 




Ma et al (2017) carried out a systematic review of the literature on direct transfers for both human 
capital development (HCD) and Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) and found little 
research that directly discussed the cost of monitoring and enforcing conditionality. In HCD 
programmes, they found some evidence that the costs associated with implementing 
conditionality increase as a programme becomes more established, but also other evidence that 
overall administrative costs (including those for monitoring and enforcing conditionality) decrease 
over time as fixed programme costs also reduce. 
Looking at both the HCD and PES literature, Ma et al (2017) find that it is unclear whether the 
benefit associated with implementing conditional programmes merits the cost of monitoring and 
enforcement, particularly as other factors besides conditionality affect outcomes. Other studies 
find some evidence that conditionality can positively affect the desired outcomes (Bastagli et al, 
2016). In the short run at least, conditional cash transfers are thought to outperform unconditional 
transfers in terms of participation indicators (such as school enrolment) and human capital 
outcomes (such as learning achievement) (Özler, 2019). However, there is also evidence that 
perception and messaging can influence behaviour and service use, which are less costly than 
managing compliance; certain desired outcomes may primarily require improvements in 
information and service provision (Bastagli et al, 2016) 
5. ‘Cash plus’ programming 
‘Cash plus’ interventions are those that combine transfers with one or more forms of 
complementary support, recognising that cash alone cannot address the structural barriers to 
well-being. These complementary interventions may be either integral to the cash transfer 
programme (such as additional benefits or in-kind transfers, or behaviour change communication 
activities) or external to it, secured by facilitating links to services provided by other sectors 
(Roelen et al, 2017). For example, where payments are being made largely through scheduled 
pay points, as in Nepal, this can be an opportunity to facilitate referral to other services (Arruda et 
al, 2020). 
The following studies provide some indications of the potential impact of this approach: 
• Nanda et al (2016), in their study of a CCT programme in Haryana that aimed to enhance 
the valued placed on girls and delay their marriage, note that social norms cannot be 
changed through financial incentives alone. They conclude that CCT programmes can be 
catalytic in terms of girls’ education and development, but that complementary 
interventions are required, such as: (i) high quality schooling; (ii) reflective dialogue with 
parents and other stakeholders on gender norms; and (iii) the provision of skills for future 
employment (as well as targeting transfers to secondary and higher levels of education in 
order to enhance employability).  
• Parsons and McCleary-Sills (2014) analyse seven World Bank Group impact evaluations 
of programmes that sought to increase girls’ educational attainment and reduce early 
marriage. Six of these were cash transfer programmes, three of them conditional. Two of 
the three supplemented cash with additional education components, including: (i) 
assigning mentors for girls; (ii) providing recreational activities and vocational skills for 
girls; (iii) improving education facilities; and (iv) providing subsidies for uniforms. The 
authors conclude that these extended CCT programmes are effective, and that strategies 
to reduce early marriage must address simultaneously its various drivers (including 




poverty, limited opportunities for education and vocational training, and the low perceived 
value of girls in society). They also emphasise the importance of balancing individual and 
family support, given families’ role in decisions about marriage. 
• Bastagli et al (2016) find that supplementing cash transfers with appropriate training or 
other measures can strengthen programme impact, but caution that there can be 
unintended impacts. They recommend further research on the short- and long-term 
effects of different combinations of activities, whether delivered through the cash transfer 
programme or by coordinating with existing interventions. However, Roelen et al (2017) 
note that, while it is important to disentangle the relative contribution of different 
components, the success of ‘cash plus’ programmes may well lie in in the total being 
more than the sum of its parts. 
• Özler (2019), citing evidence from a multi-faceted social protection programme in Ghana 
and a nutrition programme in Bangladesh, and after reviewing the general literature on 
CCT programmes over the past 15 years, concludes that the growing popularity of ‘cash 
plus’ programmes appears justified. 
The following institutional mechanisms may facilitate cash-plus approaches (Roelen et al, 2017): 
• A functioning MIS, with the capacity to deliver case management and transition citizens 
across schemes as their circumstances change. 
• Formal agreements between institutions to operationalise cross-sectoral links, such 
as memoranda of understanding that articulate roles and responsibilities, or legislative 
frameworks that underpin coordination. 
• Measures that increase awareness and engagement among stakeholders. 
• Investment in the skills of staff, particularly in managing more tailored approaches. 
Three final points may be relevant: 
• Roelen et al (2017) note that there may be situations in which it is more appropriate that 
cash transfers play the supporting role – for example where there are barriers to change 
that are more significant than income or poverty. The term ‘cash plus’ implies that the 
transfers are the central strategy, which may not always be true. 
• Ramanaik et al (2018) conclude their qualitative evaluation of the Samata programme by 
noting that dropping out of school is not a one-off event but a process, in which social 
norms interact with family circumstances. Therefore a number of complementary actions 
are required, such as promoting open communication between parents and children, 
supporting peer groups and role models for both girls and boys, and better tracking of 
girls’ attendance to spot problems early on. 
• Tebaldi & Bilo (2019) suggest that a financial literacy component may be necessary to 
ensure that women in particular can access payments with no difficulty. Alternative 
measures may be needed where there are particular cultural constraints on access, 
such as women’s restricted mobility in parts of Pakistan. 




6. Kanyashree Prakalpa programme, West Bengal 
The Kanyashree Prakalpa CCT programme in West Bengal aims to empower adolescent girls 
from socio-economically disadvantaged families by preventing child marriage, increasing 
educational attainment, and enhancing financial inclusion through the direct transfer of benefits 
to bank accounts in the girls’ names. It has the following institutional features and mechanisms 
which illustrate a number of the points discussed in previous sections. 
• Investment in preparation and planning: Between the announcement and launch of 
the scheme, the following actions were taken (UN-DESA, 2017): 
o Process maps and implementation guidelines developed. 
o Management and monitoring structures formalised and recruitment carried out. 
o Procedures and protocols established for the banking process. 
o MIS strategy and e-portal developed. 
o Training of trainers approach used with stakeholders, and implementation 
guidelines disseminated. 
o Communication strategy developed and launched. 
o State-wide events held to publicise the scheme. 
• Information and communication: A strategy was developed with the support of 
UNICEF, one of its key messages being to encourage girls to see the benefits not as 
welfare but as enabling their future empowerment through the knowledge and skills they 
acquire (UN-DESA, 2017). 
• Use of technology: The scheme has an end-to-end e-governance mechanism that is 
integrated with the systems of major banks to facilitate verification of accounts. The portal 
is bilingual, with services also available through a mobile app (UN-DESA, 2017). The use 
of e-transfers has reduced payment delays (Endow et al, 2015). 
• Monitoring and coordination: There are structures at state, district, and block levels 
where relevant departments come together. Feedback from the ground complements the 
e-governance system (UN-DESA, 2017). A baseline survey has been carried out (Endow 
et al, 2015) and independent third-party evaluations commissioned (UN-DESA, 2017; 
Sen & Dutta, 2017). 
• Grievance system: The scheme operates an online grievance system, which is also 
accessible to those not registered. District help desks facilitate direct discussion with 
citizens (Endow et al, 2015). The names and contact details of officials are published 
online. Grievances are recorded on the online portal, with SMS alerts sent to the relevant 
officials for action and to beneficiaries with updates on progress (UN-DESA, 2017). 
• Convergence with other social protection schemes: There are efforts to link 
Kanyashree girls with other initiatives from which they might benefit, such as those 
related to minorities or scheduled castes / scheduled tribes, or other adolescent 
programmes (Endow et al, 2015). 
• Civil society involvement: The work of the Indian NGO Child in Need Institute (CINI) 
illustrates how civil society organisations can complement CCT schemes. CINI’s aim is to 
strengthen existing child protection systems rather than introduce new mechanisms. An 
evaluation of its operations in Murshidabad District, West Bengal, found that its work to 




prevent child marriage had been particularly effective, using community facilitators, 
children’s groups, and early detection / advocacy by women who had been married as 
children, as well as sharing information about the Kanyashree scheme and other sources 
of financial support with girls and families (Donger & Bhabha, 2020). The evaluation by 
Sen & Dutta (2017) also highlights the importance of leadership by girls themselves, who 
can motivate and encourage behaviour change among their friends. 
• Cash-plus approach: Complementary initiatives by the programme that enhance the 
skills and self-esteem of girls include groups established in schools for life-skills, 
vocational training, or martial arts training, events and competitions, and the use of 
women role models to endorse key messages (UN-DESA, 2017).  
• Supply-side interventions: The impact of the programme has recently been reducing. 
While the proportion of girls marrying early or leaving school fell significantly in the first 
two years after the programme’s launch in 2013, this has now risen (Sen & Dutta, 2017). 
The authors identify a number of potential factors, a key one being the low quality of 
education provided, which is also associated with the high incidence of private tuition in 




10 Other factors contributing to the rising rate of school drop-out are a decline in the real value of the terminal 
amount, which has remained constant since inception (although annual amounts have risen), and a rise in self-
initiated marriage by girls in order to avoid marrying a person of their parents’ choice at 18. 
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